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The Arab Human DevelopmentReport for 20021  (hereafterAHDR or Report) is an impres-sive 170-page document (the
English version) that provides detailed
description and critical evaluation of the
economic, demographic, social and political
conditions in the Arab region. Emphasizing
the fact that all of its authors are Arab, the
Report claims to provide an insider’s look
at the problems of development in the
region.2  The Report covers all the tradi-
tional areas of interest to the U.N. Devel-
opment Program (UNDP), such as eco-
nomic growth, income distribution, demo-
graphic trends, poverty, access to educa-
tion and health care, and infant mortality.
The Report’s novelty, however, stems
primarily from at least six factors.
To start with, this is the first UNDP
report on the Arab region as a whole. This
implies U.N. recognition of the many
common (political, economic and social)
features of the countries of the region, as
well as an endorsement of Arab efforts
towards heightened economic cooperation
and eventual integration. While the Report
is mindful of the disparities among Arab
countries (as well as within each country) it
stresses the many similarities in the condi-
tions they face.3  Furthermore, the Report is
inspired by a certain pan-Arab spirit that
stresses Arab economic integration as one
chief instrument for overcoming the prob-
lems of underdevelopment and addressing
the challenges posed by globalization.
Second, the Report brings politics back
into the development picture to a far
greater extent than earlier UNDP reports.
An entire chapter (chapter 7) is devoted to
the issue of governance, with many recom-
mendations on how to reform (that is,
democratize) Arab political systems in
order to enhance their capacities to deal
with modern challenges (especially the
globalization challenge) and to provide the
Arab people with the right institutional
milieu to develop politically, economically
and intellectually. Chapter 7 provides a rich
and sophisticated analysis of political
conditions in the Arab region and the
impact of politics on development. Perhaps
the most interesting contribution of this
chapter lies in its discussion of the human-
welfare index, which is essentially a
measure of the freedoms enjoyed by
citizens. The index distinguishes between
high, medium and low human-welfare
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countries. No Arab country achieves high
human welfare, while seven Arab countries
with about 9 percent of the Arab population
enjoy medium welfare. The remaining
countries (with more than 90 percent of the
Arab population) are characterized by low
human welfare. The Report concludes, “If
development is understood as ‘a process of
expanding the real freedoms that people
enjoy’ then the challenge of human devel-
opment, calculated to include variables
associated with various forms of instrumen-
tal freedom, remains a real one for over 90
percent of the Arab population” (p. 113).
While the terms “democracy” and
“democratization” appear infrequently in
the Report, there should be no doubt that
implementing all or most of the reforms
called for in chapter 7 will lead to the
emergence of governments that fulfill
“democratic” criteria. This should be clear
in light of the institutional reforms that the
Report calls for to strengthen the powers
of legislatures, particularly their oversight
function, while ensuring that they are
“chosen based on free, honest, efficient
and regular elections” (p. 114); recognizing
the right of opposition parties to exist;
making the executive branch more ac-
countable to the legislative branch and to
the people at large; introducing or strength-
ening mechanisms for ensuring alternation
of power; making the judiciary independent
of other branches of government; trimming
the size of the civil administration and
enhancing its productivity; and strengthen-
ing the role of local governments. The
Report also calls for changing the laws
governing the formation of associations to
remove from the state the power to ban
the formation of NGOs.
Third, the Report is openly critical of
the performance of Arab regimes in most
of the areas that it covers. It faults those
regimes for allowing three interrelated
deficits to develop: the freedom, knowledge
and gender deficits. Capturing the Report’s
spirit, Alan Richards speaks of a fourth
deficit that the Report highlights; the
“democratic deficit.”4  The Report’s authors
rightly argue that enhancing citizens’ access
to knowledge and combating discrimination
against women are important goals for their
own sakes as well as for the sake of
expanding individual freedoms (and ensur-
ing such freedoms for all members of
society.) The Report highlights the inexo-
rable links between individual freedoms and
development. Not only is development not
possible without the protection of individual
freedoms (e.g. freedom of conscience,
speech and assembly, as well as economic
freedoms), but also the ultimate goal of
development is the maximization of indi-
vidual freedoms. Individual freedoms are
thus posited as both means and ends of the
development process. This focus on the
links between individual freedoms and
development should be music to the ears of
those who prefer liberal democracy to other
forms of government. Nevertheless, as
social scientists, the Report’s authors should
have tried harder to distinguish (at least at
an analytical level) between the two
concepts of development and individual
freedoms. Furthermore, while the Report
distinguishes between different types of
individual freedoms (p. 19) – mainly
political, economic and social freedoms – it
does not address the inherent contradictions
among them.5
Fourth, the Report makes a clear
distinction between the concepts of eco-
nomic growth and development. It views
development in a holistic way to include
much more than economic growth. The
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downgrading of the purely economic
aspects of development is reflected in the
construction of the Alternative Human
Development Index (AHDI), which does
not include per capita GDP as one of its
components. The AHDI (discussed in
chapter one) is based on six indicators of
development: life expectancy at birth,
educational attainment, freedom score,
gender empowerment, Internet hosts per
capita, and CO2 emissions. As the Report
notes, the ranking of the Arab countries
deteriorates as we move from the tradi-
tional HDI to the AHDI. The authors have
a simple explanation for this phenomenon:
Arab countries are richer than they are
developed.
As we will see below, the replacement
of the HDI by the AHDI received consid-
erable criticism from several Arab authors.
The Report views development in terms of
building, efficiently utilizing and, perhaps
most interestingly, “liberating” human
capabilities. As chapters 4 and 5 argue, the
building of human capabilities requires
improving health and environmental
conditions and thoroughly reforming the
educational system. The effective utiliza-
tion of human capabilities calls for stimulat-
ing economic growth to reduce unemploy-
ment and poverty as well as improving
access to information, especially via
modern means such as the Internet. As for
liberating human capabilities, this hinges on
implementing the political reforms called
for in chapter 7. As mentioned above, the
Report is clearly interested in the political
dimension of development: political reform
is not only presented as a necessary
condition for economic and social develop-
ment, but the establishment of transparent
and accountable governments (democratic
ones) is treated as one of the fundamental
goals of the development process.
Fifth, the Report does not shy away
from the sensitive issue of discrimination
against women. While the Report praises
the achievements of Arab countries in
enhancing women’s access to education, it
remains critical of the status of Arab
women. It notes, for example, that the rate
of maternal mortality in the region is double
that of Latin America and the Caribbean
and four times that of East Asia (p. 2). It
also notes that “women suffer from
unequal citizenship and legal entitlements
often found in voting rights and legal
codes” (p. 3). The Report is particularly
critical of the fact that only a small number
of Arab women hold political office in
comparison to other regions in the Third
World.  The inclusion of a Gender Empow-
erment Measure in the AHDI, and the
Report’s assertion that development that is
not engendered is endangered (p. 2), are
clear indications of the importance the
Report places on women’s empowerment.
Sixth and last, the Report exudes a
humanistic spirit that positions the individual
at the center of the development process in
a manner reminiscent of Renaissance and
Enlightenment authors in Europe who
placed the individual at the center of the
universe. This humanistic spirit (which runs
throughout the Report) is quite apparent,
especially in the first chapter and in the
chapters on education and governance
(chapters 3 and 7 respectively.) In chapter
one there is a long quote from Develop-
ment as Freedom by Nobel Prize laureate
Sen on the connection between develop-
ment and freedom (box 1.4, p. 19). In
chapter 3, and in the context of discussing
the principles that should guide the reform
of the educational system, the Report
notes: “The individual should be central to
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the learning process. Without implying
indifference to the community or absence
of cooperative behavior, the dignity of the
individual should be respected” (p. 55).
Chapter 7 views the protection and
expansion of individual freedoms as the
ultimate goal of political reform and indeed
of the entire development process. I call
this spirit humanistic rather than neoliberal
(for in neoliberalism there is also quite an
emphasis on the unleashing of individual
initiative and the protection of individual
rights, particularly property rights) because
many of the Report’s recommendations
regarding the need to fight unemployment
and poverty and to actively engage the
government in the health, women’s em-
powerment and environmental domains run
counter to the precepts of neoliberalism.
Nevertheless, neoliberals would not take
issue with several of the Report’s recom-
mendations, particularly with regard to the
primary role that the private sector should
play in the production process (with the
role of government restricted to the
regulatory and redistribution spheres), the
need for the state to respect property rights
(including intellectual-property rights) and
the importance of expanding trade and
investment links to the global economy.
In brief, the Report neither rejects nor
wholeheartedly embraces the precepts of
the neoliberal paradigm. But as a document
produced by Arab scholars, it represents a
growing awareness among at least a small
section of the region’s intelligentsia of the
many failures and the current inadequacy
of the étatist or state-led development
strategy. That this étatist development
model has encouraged the emergence and
persistence of authoritarian regimes is also
indicated in the Report, although the Report
does not dwell on the links between
authoritarianism in the political realm and
state-led growth in the economic realm.
REACTIONS TO THE REPORT
Being the first UNDP Report to cover
the Arab region as a whole – and making
some very strong assertions about the
status of women, the knowledge deficit, the
need for good governance or democracy,
and the inexorable link between develop-
ment and individual freedoms – the AHDR
triggered strong, and on the whole nega-
tive, reactions in the Arab world. This
hostile reaction can be contrasted to the far
more positive reception it received from
Western academicians, policy makers and
journalists, who approvingly quoted sec-
tions of the Report.6
One of the strongest Arab critics of the
Report is the Palestinian author Munir
Shafic, who questions the validity of the
AHDI, arguing that it is not necessarily a
better measure of development than the
more conventional HDI.7  Shafic quotes the
renowned Egyptian economist Galal Amin
(another critic of the Report), who ques-
tioned the validity of giving equal weight to
all six components of the AHDI, as well as
the existence of a causal link between such
components and development.  Shafic
notes that the only reason behind employ-
ing the AHDI was to bring down the
ranking of Arab countries to the lowest
possible level. Galal Amin makes the same
accusation.8  Shafic also takes issue with
the AHDR’s contention that the freedom,
knowledge and gender deficits are causes
of underdevelopment. He points to coun-
tries that achieved remarkable develop-
ment under authoritarian regimes (e.g. the
East Asian Tigers and China). He also
notes that the empowerment of women in
the West came as a consequence of the
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Industrial Revolution (development) and
was not a cause of it. George Corm, a
Christian intellectual who served as
Lebanon’s finance minister 1998-2000, also
questions the existence of any linkage
between development and democracy.9  He
argues that the issue of individual freedom,
while important in itself, should be sepa-
rated from that of development. He further
notes that an equitable distribution of
income should take precedence over
granting economic freedoms.
 It is clear that there is a fundamental
difference here between Amin, Corm and
Shafic and the authors of the AHDR
regarding what development means. Amin,
Corm and Shafic still view development in
the more traditional sense of economic
growth, probably accompanied by a better
distribution of income, but they are not
sensitive to the political dimensions of
development (e.g., that without individual
freedoms and good governance – or
democracy – there is no development).
A more moderate critic is Ahmad
Baalbaki, who also faults the Report for
giving prominence to issues of knowledge
acquisition and individual freedoms in the
measurement of human development, and
for not stressing the role of international
factors (mainly Western political and
economic dominance and the prescriptions
of the World Bank and IMF) in causing
underdevelopment (and in particular
poverty) in the Third World.10   Riyad
Tabbara, Lebanon’s former ambassador to
the United States, who currently heads a
research center, has strongly criticized the
methodology of the Report and its findings.
His criticisms focus on the validity of the
AHDR as a measure of development and
the selective use of statistics in the Report
to portray a gloomy picture of human
conditions in the Arab region. Tabbara
further warns that the Report would play
into the hands of Western media to further
tarnish the image of Arab and Muslim
societies, following the events of Septem-
ber 11, and could be used by Western
governments to impose change from
outside in the name of democracy or good
governance.11  Clovis Maksoud, the Arab
League’s former representative at the
United Nations, and a member of the
AHDR’s advisory board, responded in
detail to the criticisms of Tabbara, noting
that political change must come from
inside, because it is in the interest of the
Arab people, regardless of the West’s
position towards democracy and individual
freedoms.12
Mounir Khawaja, professor at the
American University of Beirut, observes
that the AHDR emphasizes the negative
aspects of development in the Arab coun-
tries over the positive ones.13  He further
accuses the Report’s authors of painting a
bleak picture of the development situation by
deliberately excluding per capita GDP from
their AHDI, while including other indicators
on which they knew the Arab region was
going to score low. According to Khawaja,
the AHDR assumed that Arab countries had
the freedom to choose their development
policies; those choices were, however,
framed by the prevalent international
environment, he noted. Similar to Tabbara,
who argued that the Report was that of
activists rather than academics, he con-
cluded that the AHDR was a political report
rather than an academic or scientific one.
Hassan Mneimineh, professor at the
Lebanese University, took issue with the
AHDR’s contention that the Arab region
fell well behind other Third World regions
in terms of the freedoms enjoyed by its
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citizens.14  He questioned whether the
citizens of countries that toed the U.S. line
(such as South Korea) were really freer
than Arab citizens.  Mneimineh further
objected to the way the AHDR gave
Jordan and Kuwait (two U.S. allies) the
highest scores within the Arab region for
the independence of their media.
Saudi author Nouaiman Uthman, who
is more balanced in his assesment, also
criticized the AHDR for the way it defines
poverty, its play on words (using al-
tanmiyyah al-insaniyyah rather than al-
tarbiyyah al-bashariyyah) and its neglect
of the role of religion as a factor influenc-
ing the different aspects of the develop-
ment process.15
 Naturally, not all Arab thinkers came
out against the Report. The late Edward
Said agreed with what the Report had to
say about the absence of democracy,
persistent discrimination against women,
and the lagging behind of the Arab region in
the scientific and technological domains.16
Fahmia Sharaf Eddine, a professor at the
Lebanese University, praised the Report’s
methodology and findings; she criticized the
Report, however, for not going far enough
in recommending how to change current
conditions in the Arab world.
Furthermore, a cursory look at the
views (expressed in English) of Arab
intellectuals residing in the United States
reveals a more sympathetic appraisal of
the AHDR than the one generally given by
Arab intellectuals residing in the region and
writing in Arabic.17  One may argue though
that Arab authors residing in the West and
writing mainly for a Western audience had
little or no impact on Arab public opinion,
since their views were expressed in venues
that did not reach the Arab world. In brief,
those intellectuals who spoke (in Arabic) in
favor of the Report represented a minority
within the Arab intelligentsia.
EXPLAINING THE HOSTILITY
The task at hand is to explain the
causes of the negative, even hostile,
reaction from Arab thinkers residing in the
region to the Report’s conclusions and
recommendations.  First, many Arab
intellectuals seem to worry about the
consequences of implementing liberal
reforms (in the political, civic and economic
realms) on the state’s ability to retain its
commanding position in society. This
preference for strong (but not necessarily
tyrannical) states remains rampant among
Arab intellectuals.  Many of them have
experienced a certain upward mobility
thanks to greater state intervention in the
economy and society (e.g., through free
education at state universities.) At a more
ideological level, a strong state is deemed
essential for promoting the “grand causes”
(to use John Waterbury’s term18) that Arab
intellectuals and a broad section of the
Arab public continue to believe in: Arab
unity, economic and social development
(defined rather differently from how the
AHDR defines them), the application of
the Sharia (for the Islamists) and the
struggle against Israel and Western imperi-
alism. A strong state is needed to promote
such causes. When adopting a critical
posture towards their regimes, Arab
intellectuals are far more likely to complain
about the failure of safety nets to protect
the poor and unemployed, the emergence
of crony capitalism (often blamed on
privatization), and the inability or unwilling-
ness of Arab regimes to stand up to the
United States and Israel than about the
lack of individual freedoms and democracy.
Second, Arab intellectuals are appre-
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hensive about how criticism of economic,
social and political conditions in the Arab
world (especially when such criticisms
come from inside the region) can be used
by Western governments and the Western
media to discredit Arab states and under-
mine their achievements in the post-
independence period. All the above-cited
critics of the AHDR share this concern.
There are deep-seated reasons that so
many Arab intellectuals (and perhaps the
majority of Arab populations) mistrust and
even fear the West. This is not the place to
discuss these reasons. Nevertheless, one
may mention a few related factors: (1) the
experience with Western imperialism (even
in the guise of the mandate system), (2) the
establishment of the state of Israel (with
British and U.S. backing)19  and the
consistent support it has received from the
West, (3) U.S. animosity towards Egyptian
President Gamal Abdel Nasser20  (still
cherished by many Arab intellectuals),
(4) the failure of Arab oil-exporting coun-
tries to maintain control over the price of
oil beyond a brief period in the 1970s,
(5) U.S. naval and military presence in the
Persian Gulf area since the early 1980s,
and (6) the recent U.S. invasion and
occupation of Iraq.
Despite their many differences, secular
Arab nationalists and Islamists are equally
apprehensive about Western intensions
towards the region. For them, Western
governments are either not really demo-
cratic or not interested in promoting
democratic governments in the Arab and
Muslim worlds for a mixture of economic
and strategic reasons. The attack on the
AHDR was in part a response to the
positive way in which it was received in
Western circles and hailed in The New
York Times, The Financial Times, The
Guardian and The Economist.21  For Arab
thinkers like Amin, Shafic and Tabbara, the
AHDR provided ammunition to the West,
and the United States in particular, in its
assault on the Arab and Muslim parts of
the world. Tabbara, for example, pointed
out how anti-Arab authors like Thomas
Friedman sought to use the Report to
legitimize the U.S. war on Iraq or to
discredit the Arab struggle against Israel.22
Maksoud ably answers this charge. He
argues that it is the duty of Arab intellectu-
als to identify the political, economic and
social problems that the Arab region is
reeling under and to recommend solutions
to these problems. It is better for the
impetus for reform to come from the inside
rather than the outside via Western govern-
ments and Western-dominated financial
institutions like the World Bank and IMF.
Maksoud, Nader Fargany (the lead author
of the Report) and the few Arab thinkers
who contributed editorials in Arabic
newspapers in support of the AHDR were,
however, clearly in the minority and on the
defensive.  If the AHDR was intended to
provide an insider’s view of the problems
of development, freedom and democracy in
the Arab World, this view was not shared
by the majority of Arab thinkers residing in
the region.
THE AHDR, THE WEST AND
DEMOCRACY
The AHDR achieved one minimal
objective.  It succeeded in triggering a
debate about the meaning and dimensions
of human development, particularly the
relationship between democracy and
development. The intensity of the criticisms
leveled at the Report, however, reveals that
a major segment of the Arab intelligentsia
has (to be gracious) ambivalent attitudes
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toward individual liberties, democracy, free
access to information and gender equality.
Such attitudes are clearly a hindrance to
the development of liberal-democratic
institutions and practices.
As for the Arab citizens (the ones that
the Report was supposed to help), I am
doubtful that the Report’s authors were
able to reach them. The Report did not
draw the attention of broad segments of
the Arab public. The debate about it, while
intense, was over in a few months. Fur-
thermore, the Arab media (including those
free of state control) devoted far less
attention to the Report than they did to the
Palestinian intifada, Iraq and the U.S. anti-
terror campaign. It has been more than a
year since the Report’s appearance (a
second AHDR was released in October
2003), and there have been no apparent
efforts on the part of Arab governments to
implement any of its recommendations, or
any pressures from below on Arab govern-
ments to do so.
Most Arab citizens seem to worry
more about events in Palestine and Iraq,
and their own survival under tough and
uncertain economic conditions, than they
do about democracy, freedoms, Internet
access and gender empowerment.  Demo-
cratic attitudes and practices are not likely
to flourish under conditions of political and
economic uncertainty and in states and
societies that feel besieged by more
powerful forces. As The Economist points
out, in the Arab world the emphasis is
much more on national liberation, as
currently represented by the struggle of the
Palestinians against Israeli occupation
(and perhaps in the struggle of the Iraqis
against U.S. occupation) than on individual
liberty.23
Neither has U.S. policy, especially in
the aftermath of September 11, helped the
cause of democracy in the region. As Alan
Richards points out:
. . . [T]he main result of the post-9/11
policy shifts has been to ensure that
any authoritarian who resolutely
pursued violent enemies of the United
States could depend upon U.S.
support. Such an environment only
strengthens hardliners within authori-
tarian regimes, giving them fewer
reasons than before to seek accommo-
dation with opposition elements.24
But it was not just the United States.
The West as a whole did not act to pro-
mote democracy in the Arab region. In the
words of Chris Patten:
Given the support the West has
extended to oppressive Arab regimes,
it is understandable that all this talk of
democratization arouses suspicion on
the so-called Arab street. For too long,
Western countries have followed the
path of expediency in the Middle East,
propping up pro-Western strongmen
for fear that what might replace them
would be substantially worse.25
Patten’s views are shared by the great
majority of Arab and Muslim thinkers, who
are quite dubious about Western claims
regarding the promotion of democracy in
the Arab and Muslim world. Muqtedar
Khan, for instance, writes, “Many [Muslims
and Arabs] remain skeptical as well as
cynical, since democracy in the Middle East
was never in the U.S. interest in the past,
and a democratic Middle East may make
the pursuit of narrowly conceived U.S.
interests in the region more difficult.”26
Jordan’s foreign minister, Marwan
Muashar, warns that U.S. ramblings about
baroudi.p65 2/12/2004, 2:26 PM139
140
MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XI, NO. 1, SPRING 2004
“rearranging the region” are weakening the
hands of reformers who seek democratic
change by making them look like they are
“doing America’s bidding.”27
In conclusion, and despite a few
positive signs coming from Jordan, Mo-
rocco and the small Gulf states, the pros-
pects for democracy in the Arab region do
not seem to be particularly bright. The
cause of democracy is hindered by at least
three main factors. First, regimes in pivotal
Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, Syria
and Egypt are extremely reluctant to
democratize out of fear of losing power.
For authoritarian and not-so-popular
regimes, losing power is tantamount to
losing political relevance and even risking
the loss of life (or at least property ac-
quired during years in power) for members
of the regime and their families.
Second, and as the hostile reactions to
the AHDR reveal, the Arab intelligentsia
(in both its secular and Islamic wings) has
not been won over to the cause of democ-
racy, particularly its liberal variant. To put it
succinctly, opinion shapers in the region are
not sending clear and consistent messages
to the Arab populations in favor of democ-
racy and individual freedoms.
Finally, the whole debate over democ-
racy seems to generate only limited interest
in the so-called Arab street. What the
struggling Arab masses seem to aspire to is
not liberal democracy, but the success of the
Palestinians in ridding themselves of Israeli
occupation (while making as few conces-
sions as possible to the Jewish state); the
restoration of Iraq as a strong, united and
independent (but not necessarily demo-
cratic) state; the end of U.S. hegemony
over the region; and the building of just
domestic orders in which the state acquires
an Islamic character (by basing its laws on
the Islamic Sharia), while reaffirming its role
as protector (against external enemies) and
provider for the less fortunate.
Finally, the United States and the West,
in general, do not seem to be overly
troubled by the lack of democracy in the
Arab region.28  But, even if they were,
given prevailing attitudes about the West
(and the United States in particular), it is
not likely that Western pressure would aid
the cause of democracy. On the contrary, it
might backfire.
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